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Group Legal Services and the Right
of Association
The United States Supreme Court has recently curtailed the
reach of state statutes that prohibit solicitation of legal business. In
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two unprecedented opinions the Court has held that the soliciting
activities of lay organizations fall within the protection of the right
of association.
National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v.
Button1 grew out of Virginia's plan of massive resistance to school
integration.2 The state expanded its anti-solicitation statutes in 1956
to include group activities3 in an attempt to suppress an NAACP
system which secured litigants through meetings conducted to explain the legal means for desegregation. It was common practice at
such gatherings to distribute forms which authorized the NAACP or
Defense Fund attorneys to represent the signers in subsequent civil
rights litigation. The United States Supreme Court held that antisolicitation statutes could not constitutionally be applied to prohibit
these activities. In the context of NAACP objectives, association for
the promotion of litigation was protected by the right of association,
and Virginia had shown no valid reason for restraining the exercise
of this first amendment freedom. 4
A similar issue arose in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
1. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
2. 371 U.S. at 445-46 (Douglas, J., concurring). See note 35 infra.
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-74, 54-78, 54-79 (1958), as amended, Va. Acts Extra Sess.
1956 ch. 33. The prohibitions read in pertinent part (amendments in italics):
"§ 54-74 ••. (6) 'Any malpractice, or any unlawful or dishonest or unworthy or
corrupt or unprofessional conduct,' as used in this section, shall be construed to
include the improper solicit:ition of any legal or professional business or employment, either directly or indirectly, OT the acceptance of employment, retainer,
compensation or costs from any person, partnership, corporation, organization
or association with knowledge that such person, partnership, corporation,
organization or association has violated any provision of article 7 of this
chapter...•
"§ 54-78 •.. (1) A 'runner' or 'capper' is any person, corporation, partnership
or association acting in any manner or in any capacity as an agent for an
attorney at law within this State or for any person, partnership, corporation,
organization or association which employs, retains OT compensates any attorney
at law in connection with any judicial proceeding in which such person, partnership, corporation, organization or association is not a party and in which it
has no pecuniary right or liability, in the solicitation or procurement of business
for such attorney at law or for such person, partnership, corporation, organization
or association in connection with any judicial proceedings for which such
attorney or such person, partnership, corporation, organization or association
is employed, retained or compensated. . • •
"§ 54-79 ..• It shall be unlawful for any person, corporation, partnership or
association to act as a runner or capper as defined in § 54-78 to solicit any
business for an attorney at law or such person, partnership, corporation, organization or association. • • ."
4. 371 U.S. at 431, 444. See text accompanying notes 16, 17 & 35 infra. Mr. Justice
Douglas concurred, noting that the Virginia statute apparently reflected a legislative
purpose to penalize the NAACP. Mr. Justice White concurred in part but dissented
from the apparent breadth of the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by
Justices Clark and Stewart, dissented on the ground that Virginia had a valid interest
in imposing "reasonable regulations limiting the permissible form of litigation and
the manner of legal representation within its borders." 371 U.S. at 455. He concluded
that such regulation was undeniably a matter of legitimate concern to the state
and its "possible impact on ·the rights of expression and association [was] • • • far
too remote to cause any doubt as to [the statute's] ••• validity.'' Ibid.
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Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar.5 The union maintained a legal
aid program which divided the country into sixteen regions where
attorneys or firms with a reputation for skill in personal injury
litigation were selected upon the advice of local counsel and judges.
After injury to a union worker, a Brotherhood representative would
recommend that the claim not be settled before consultation with an
approved regional attorney. 6 The Virginia courts held that state antisolicitation statutes proscribed this arrangement, and they enjoined
the Brotherhood from "holding out lawyers selected by it as the only
approved lawyers to aid the members or their families; .•. or in any
other manner soliciting or encouraging such legal employment of
selected lawyers." 7 The United States Supreme Court vacated this
ruling, holding that the union's activities were protected from state
interference by the first amendment. 8
These cases underscore two notable trends in recent constitutional interpretation. First, the decisions point up the increasing emphasis placed by the Court on the necessity for competent attorneys
in all stages of legal proceedings. This right to counsel has recently
been expanded in a line of criminal cases.9 Brotherhood and Button
may intimate analogous considerations in civil litigation. Viewed as
an initial step within this development, the cases may simply stand
for the proposition that lay organizations may develop and utilize the
particular legal aid programs approved by the Court.10
It is apparent, however, that the decisions are of broader significance. The Court placed no discernible limitations on the exercise
of the right to establish group legal services. Consequently, the cases
raise implications for the bar which may require a change in the
traditional approach to the practice of law. Typically, both attorneys and laymen have been forbidden to engage in the solicitation
5. 377 U.S. 1 (1964), rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 960 (1964).
6. Id. at 4.
7. Ibid.
8. Id. at 8. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the disposition of the case. Mr.
Justice Clark, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, dissented on the ground that "the potential
for evil in the union's system is enormous" and, therefore, that it is a valid subject
of state regulation. 377 U.S. at 12. He found the Button decision inapposite authority
to support the majority opinion because Brotherhood's personal injury litigation
was not a "form of political expression." Id. at 10. Compare text accompanying
notes 18-23, 36 & 37 infra.
9. E.g, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (refusal to let defendant consult
with counsel during interrogation violates due process); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964) (admission at trial of incriminating statements made after indictment
and without benefit of counsel violates fifth and sixth amendments); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel made applicable to state prosecu•
tions).
10. See Simpson, Group Legal Services-The Case for Caution, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
327 (1965). But see Bodle, Group Legal Services-The Case for BRT, 12 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 306, 323 (1965).
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of legal business and related activities. 11 Under the decisions in
Button and Brotherhood, however, the exercise of legislative or
judicial power to control the legal profession has been severely curtailed by the first amendment protection seemingly granted to group
legal aid programs similar to those in the principal cases. Bar canons,
rules of professional conduct, and state legislation must be reevaluated and brought into conformity with allowable group legal
aid programs.12 It is clear that such programs fall within basic needs
of our legal system, and the bar will no longer be permitted to ignore
these needs. 13
The Button and Brotherhood cases are also indicative of a second
trend in recent constitutional interpretation. The decisions emphasize not only the broad sweep that has been granted to first
amendment freedoms generally, but also the recent developments in
the area of associational rights. This generalized right of association
has developed only within the last decade as a cognate to freedom of
assembly. 14 In its first clear enunciation, the right was limited to the
holding that every citizen should have the freedom to engage in
political expression and association. 15 This definition was subsequently expanded to include association for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas.16
Button re-examines the scope to be afforded the right of association. While, arguably, the decision approves of association for
11. See, e.g., note 3 supra, notes 12 & 31 infra.
12. It appears that canons 28 ("stirring up litigation, directly or through agents'),
35 ("intermediaries') and 47 ("aiding the unauthorized practice of law') of the
American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics now require some rewriting. In addition, many state rules of professional conduct (e.g., CAL, Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 6076) will need revision, as will state statutes similar to those of Virginia.
This far-reaching development has naturally aroused a great amount of bar disapproval, as evidenced b)i the approximately forty state and four local bar associations
which joined in the ABA petition for rehearing of the Brotherhood decision. 377
U.S. 960 (1964).
13 See The Availability of Counsel and Group Legal Services-A Symposium,
12 U.C.L.A.L. R.Ev. 279, 280 (1965), where Professor Schwartz notes that: "What
is strikingly significant about this array of discussions is that with only one dissent
the contributors to the Symposium agree that [Brotherhood] .•• heralds a new era
for the legal profession; that the change was a long time coming; and that there
is now an opportunity, perhaps the first in history, for the Bar-free of the type of
restrictions struck down in • • • [Brotherhood]-to fulfill its primary function of
providing legal services for those who are in need of them." Cf. MURPHY & PRITCHE'IT,
COURTS, JUDGES, AND PoLmcs 274-311 (1961).
14. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (Black, J., concurring). One
commentator views the right of association as not fully incorporated into the right
of assembly. .ABERNATIIY, THE RIGHT OF AssEMBLY AND AssoCIATION 237 (1961).
Another writer, on the other hand, argues that "associational rights, to the extent
they exist, are not derived solely from the first amendment. Rather they are implied
in the whole constitutional framework for the protection of individual liberty in
a democratic society." Emerson, Freedom of Assodation and Freedom of Expression,
74 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1964).
15. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
16. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
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the promotion of any litigation, the language of the opinion is much
narrower. The Court was careful to point out that "for such a
group, association for litigation may be the most effective form of
political association." 17 The import of the Court's reasoning thus
could be interpreted as limiting protection to associational activities
that facilitate goals basically political in character, a conclusion consonant with the traditional orderly group activity protected by the
first amendment.
Brotherhood, on the other hand, appears to fall outside the
limitations enunciated in earlier decisions. In this case the Court
protected the union's activity on the grounds that the privilege of
members to assist and advise each other was indispensable to implementation of rights granted by Congress under the Safety Appliance
Act18 and the Federal Employers Liability Act.19 Assuming the right
to associate was necessary to preserve the efficacy of these federal
statutes,20 it nevertheless seems that the result in the case might
better have been rested on the basis of the supremacy clause21 instead
of the first amendment. Defending the union's plan as necessary to
preserve rights granted under federal laws is perhaps understandable,
but to equate this protection with the reach of the first amendment
freedom of association seems both unnecessary and unwise. The
union's primary interest in its members' litigation was a desire to
see that skillful attorneys were obtained so that recoveries might
fully compensate injuries. The mere fact of association should not
make this essentially economically-motivated activity meritorious of
first amendment protection.22 By its decision in Brotherhood, the
Court has unwisely extended protection of the right of association
to what seems merely "a procedure for the settlement of damage
claims."28
17. 371 U.S. at 431.
18. 27 Stat. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 26, 27 (1958).
19. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1958).
20. 377 U.S. at 5. See also id. at 7, where the Court refers to "the right of individuals and the public to be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress to
effectuate a basic public interest." (Emphasis added.) The legislative history of the
FELA lends weight to the argument that one of its purposes was to facilitate
litigation by union members. See 42 CONG. R.Ec. 4435- (1908).
21. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; ••• shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CoNsr. art.
VI, § 2. Commenting on the supremacy clause and the FELA, the Court bas stated:
"[W]ben Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it br the Constitution, adopted ••• [the FELA], it spoke for all the people and al the States,
and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of
[a state] ••• as if the act bad emanated from its own legislature, and should be
respected accordingly in the courts of the State." Mondou v. New York, N.H.
& H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912).
22. Compare NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963): "In the context of
NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences." See
note 24 infra.
23, 377 U.S. 1, 10 (Clark, J. dissenting).
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It would have been preferable, and more harmonious with
the fundamental nature of first amendment concepts, if protection
of asserted rights of association were permitted only if the basic goal
of such activities were the advocacy of beliefs or political ideas. This
would preclude first amendment protection of activities pointed
toward the creation of purely economic advantages.24 The question
in every case should be whether the activity concerns a basic promotion of expression or communication.25
Lacking any such limitation at present, it must be assumed that
the right of association now encompasses group legal aid plans.
Even within this context, however, the principal cases are not clear
as to the weight to be given a state's interest in the regulation of its
legal profession. Freedom of association, as part of the first amendment, is applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. 26 But first amendment rights are not absolute; their exercise
may be circumscribed in the presence of an overriding state interest.27 Several tests have been employed by the Court to determine
the degree of state interest necessary to justify abridgment of first
24. To extend the right of association as a first amendment protection to any
activities could, carried to its logical limit, perhaps lead to an assertion of a right
collusively to fix prices, etc. The Brotherhood decision suggests use by the Court of
the first amendment as a substitute for substantive due process, including concomitant concepts of reasonableness of state regulaion. In this context, it should
be noted that if economic liberty were found to be the determinative factor justifying referral programs, some members of the Court would find no constitutional
basis for attacking state regulations, having long refused to recoguize substantive
due process limitations in this area. See, e.g., Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &: Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
52 (1942). Cf. Mr. Justice White's dissent in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
685 (1962), where he objects to the majority's application of the cruel and unusual
punishment prohibition to invalidate a state narcotics law, arguing that "if this
case involved economic regulation, the present Court's allergy to substantive due
process would surely save the statute and prevent the Court from imposing its
own philosophical predilictions upon state legislatures or Congress." Id. at 689. In
any case, at least two specific groups have heretofore been denied the right to
utilize group legal services, and they will undoubtedly seek to relitigate the point
in the light of Brotherhood. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor
Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935) (auto club); People ex rel. Courtney v. Ass'n
of Real Estate Tax-payers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933) (taxpayers association).
See generally The Availability of Counsel and Group Legal Services-A Symposium,
supra note 13.
25. A related analysis of first amendment protection problems has been enunciated
by Professor Emerson, supra note 14. His method of examination would draw a
distinction between "expression" and "action." The former would be entitled to
complete protection and the latter protection subject to reasonable regulation. This
analysis, of course, presupposes that ·the activity is initially within the scope of
the first amendment and therefore his analysis differs from that in the present
text, which would delimit protection at a more fundamental stage.
26. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960).
27. E.g., id. at 524; American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
394-95 (1950). But see Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960); Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUF. CT. R.Ev. 245.
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amendment freedoms. 28 In the principal cases the Court balanced
associational rights against the state's interest in regulating its legal
profession, and in neither case was Virginia's concern held to be
sufficient.
Ad hoc balancing tests have generally given some weight to state
regulation of local problems.29 The Virginia statutes at first glance
appear representative of valid local interests. They conform to a
history30 of state regulation aimed at prohibiting the common-law
offenses of champerty, barratry, and maintenance.31 When modem
offshoots, advertising and solicitation, developed, the states reacted
by prohibiting these activities through statutory or decisional
means. 32 The constitutionality of such interdictions has heretofore
been sustained,33 and states have usually been held to have a substantial interest in the regulation of their legal profession, even as
against asserted first amendment rights. 34
Button's peculiar facts may have dictated the result which overcame the state interests involved. The Court emphasized the context in which the statutes had been enacted. They appeared to be
specifically aimed at hampering NAACP activities and were recognized as part of Virginia's resistance to desegregation. 35 Brotherhood
cannot be sustained on the same grounds. There the legislation
was not directed against the union. Moreover, there was a long
Brotherhood history of requiring approved attorneys to kick back
part of their fees. 36 Virginia thus would appear to have had a valid
interest in applying anti-solicitation statutes to this scheme, which
seemingly presented a substantial danger that high standards of
28. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ("clear and present
danger" test); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) ("bad tendency" test);
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, supra note 27, at 400 ("balancing" test);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) ("absolute"
test).
29. For favorable comment on use of the "balancing" test, see Karst, Legislative
Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 75. For criticism, see Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 912-14 (1963).
30. A state tradition of supervision lends weight to the validity of its regulation.
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959).
31. See 14 AM. JuR. 2d, Champerty and Maintenance § 1 (1964); Inciting Litigation,
3 RACE REL. L. REP. 1257, 1261-63 (1958). See generally 4 BLACKSfONE COMMENTARIES
•134-36.
32. In re McDonald, 204 Minn. 61, 282 N.W. 677 (1938); Annot., 53 A.L.R. 279
(1928). See generally 63 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1502, 1504-07 (1963).
33. See, e.g., McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107 (1920); Hildebrand v. State Bar,
36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950); Hightower v. Detroit Edison Co., 262 Mich. 1,
247 N.W. 97 (1933).
34. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
35. For a brief examination of Virginia's "massive resistance" legislation, see
Birkby 8: Murphy, Interest Group Conflict in the Judicial Arena-The First Amendment and Group Access to the Courts, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 1018, 1021-30 (1964).
36 377 U.S. at 9 (Clark, J., dissenting). See In re Brotherhood.of R.R. Trainmen,
13 Ill, 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958),

1096

Michigan Law Review

legal conduct might be compromised. Perhaps only the lack of a
showing by Virginia of specific substantive evils flowing from the
union's legal referral plan prevented subordination of first amendment rights.87 If this assumption is correct, the implication is that
in future cases it will be incumbent upon the states to demonstrate
that particular types of associational conduct will result in specified
evils that the state should be allowed to prohibit before a state policy
prohibiting such association will receive approval by the Supreme
Court.88
37. This viewpoint is implicit, for example, in the holding of the Richmond,
Virginia, Chancery Court upon remand of the Brotherhood case. The Virginia court
held that the United States Supreme Court had not approved of "the commercialization of the legal profession and 'ambulance chasing' or any of the objectionable
practices of the Brotherhood in this case." Thus, only that part of the decree which
enjoined the Brotherhood from advising its members to consult with recommended
attorneys was unconstitutional, in the view of the Virginia court. Virginia State
Bar v. Railroad Trainmen, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2387 (Richmond, Va. Chancery Ct., Jan.
15, 1965).
38. In State Bar v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 374 Mich. 152, 132 N.W.2d 78
(1965), the Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded a Michigan circuit court
injunction similar to the one granted by the Richmond Chancery Court in the Virginia
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen action. The Michigan Supreme Court, however,
remanded with permission for amendment of the Michigan State Bar's bill, apparently
implying that a more specific injunction directed against particular Brotherhood
practices wonld be constitutional.

